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Abstract
This paper describes a hardware architecture for modu-
lar multiplication operation which is efficient for bit-lengths
suitable for both commonly used types of Public Key Cryp-
tography (PKC) i.e. ECC and RSA Cryptosystems. The
challenge of current PKC implementations is to deal with
long numbers (160-2048 bits) in order to achieve system’s
efficiency, as well as security. RSA, still the most popular
PKC, has at its root the modular exponentiation operation.
Modular exponentiation consists of repeated modular mul-
tiplications, which is also the basic operation for ECC pro-
tocols. The solution proposed in this work uses a systolic
array implementation and can be used for arbitrary preci-
sions. We also present modular exponentiation based on the
Montgomery’s Multiplication Method (MMM).
Keywords: Montgomery’s Multiplication Method, Pub-
lic Key Cryptography, RSA, ECC, FPGA, systolic array
1 Introduction
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman introduced the idea of public
key cryptography [5]. They used this concept to eliminate
the need for a secure channel to exchange some secret infor-
mation. Also, digital signatures were introduced which al-
low to uniquely bind a message to its sender. Since then, nu-
merous public-key cryptosystems have been proposed and
all these systems based their security on the difficulty of
some mathematical problem. The most prominent examples
are RSA, named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adel-
man [23] and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC), which
are proposed by Koblitz [13] and Miller [18]. When com-
paring these two most popular public-key cryptosystems,
there are several aspects to be taken into account such as:
security, key lengths, speed and implementation issues. For
security, the hardness of the underlying mathematical prob-
lem is essential. It is important to point out that ECC are
plural equivalent security as RSA for much smaller key
sizes. The reason is that all algorithms solving the math-
ematical problem on which ECC are based take fully ex-
ponential time. Other benefits include higher speed, lower
power consumption and smaller certificates which is espe-
cially useful in constrained environments (smart cards, cel-
lular phones, pagers etc.). The basic operation for RSA is
modular exponentiation which can be realized by using re-
peated multiplications over GF (p). The basic operation for
ECC is point multiplication which also relies on efficient
finite field multiplication. Commonly used finite fields in
ECC protocols are GF (p) and GF (2n). As a consequence,
a substantial amount of research is focused on efficient and
secure implementation of modular multiplication in hard-
ware.
In 1985 Montgomery introduced a new method for mod-
ular multiplication [19]. The approach of Montgomery
avoids the time consuming trial division that is a common
bottleneck of other algorithms. His method is proved to
be very efficient and is the basis of many implementations
of modular multiplication, both in software and hardware.
In this paper we look at an efficient hardware implementa-
tion of the Montgomery’s modular multiplication (MMM)
in FPGA.
Efficient implementation of the MMM in hardware was
considered by many authors [1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
14, 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36].
A systolic array architecture is one possibility for imple-
mentations of public key cryptography in hardware. Vari-
ous solutions for systolic arrays were proposed, for exam-
ple [1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36].
Our contribution is in combining a systolic array archi-
tecture, which is assumed to be the best choice for hard-
ware on current integrated circuits (ICs), with the MMM
in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). In this work
we present the implementation results of a modular expo-
nentiator which we designed using our MMM circuit. The
implementation results for ECC using MMM can be found
in [20]. Similar work was done by Blum and Paar [3]. How-
ever, their solution is less efficient because they had to use
an extra step in the main algorithm for the MMM; this step
was required because they do not use the optimal bound
for the main parameter R (so-called Montgomery param-
eter) [37]. The modular exponentiation algorithm is usu-
ally repeating modular multiplication around 1500 times
(assuming balanced Hamming weight of the exponent) for
1024-bit operands. Therefore, the implementation in [3] is
far less efficient compared to implementation in this work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the underlying methods invented by Montgomery
are explained in detail and we introduce common notation
and parameters. We also give some comments on the bound
condition for avoiding subtraction at the end of every expo-
nentiation step introduced by Walter [37]. Section 3 gives a
survey of previous work on systolic arrays and Montgomery
based operations in hardware. Section 4 describes a sys-
tolic array architecture and design steps as well as the re-
sults of implementation. Conclusions and benchmarks for
future work conclude the paper.
2 Previous work
This section reviews some of the most relevant previ-
ous contributions in this area. Eldridge and Walter [6] and
Kornerup [14] were the first researchers who report hard-
ware solutions for implementing the Montgomery’s Mul-
tiplication Method. However, Iwamura, Matsumoto and
Imai [10, 9] are the first ones to our knowledge proposing a
systolic array which can execute a modular exponentiation
operation using Montgomery modular multiplication.
Tenca and Koc¸ introduced a pipelined Montgomery mul-
tiplier, which has the ability to work on any given operand
precision and is adjustable to any chip area in [26]. Savas¸ et
al. used the same design methodology to obtain a dual-field
multiplier, i.e., the unit which can handle multiplication in
both types of finite fields in [24]. That multiplier would
have obvious benefits for many applications of public key
cryptography.
Iwamura, Matsumoto and Imai [11] considered the usual
bottleneck for hardware implementations of Montgomery’s
algorithm, i.e., the fact that the number of output bits may
exceed the number of input bits. They derived the bound
R ≥ 2n+2 for R = 2r. Hence, they concluded that
r = n + 2 is the minimum possible value for which the
examination of the size of the output each time the Mont-
gomery method is executed, may be omitted. This property
is desired in order to be able to feed back directly the result
of each multiplication. Here, n is the maximal number of
bits of N , N < 2n. This bound can be further improved to
the condition R > 4N , which is according to Walter [37],
the best possible bound in practice. The work of Walter
offers many useful results for Montgomery’s techniques.
In [34], which is further improved in [37], he showed that
the Montgomery exponentiation method requires no final
subtraction, which is very important for fast implementa-
tions. Detailed review of previous work can be found in [2].
Relevant previous work considering FPGA is presented
by Blum and Paar [3]. The latency of processing elements
used to construct the systolic array introduced in that work
is higher than the processing elements introduced in this
work. This difference brings to our work higher clock fre-
quency, hence results in a fast implementation. We also im-
prove on the work of [3] by giving a practical implemen-
tation of the most recent theoretical work on the bound.
More precisely, in their work the Montgomery parameter
R is set as R = 2n+3. We use 4N < R = 2n+2. In this
way, the number of repetitions for Montgomery’s algorithm
is only n + 2 for radix 2 implementations, compared with
n + 3. In the case of higher radix it can perform multipli-
cation in dn+2α e as explained in [1]. Also this architecture
is equally suitable for both types of cryptography, ECC as
well as RSA. Note that, the same authors have reported an
implementation with high-radix in [4].
3 Montgomery Modular Multiplication
For modular multiplication Montgomery’s technique is
chosen [19]. Montgomery multiplication is defined as fol-
lows:
Mont(x, y) = xyR−1 mod N (1)
For a word base b = 2α, R should be chosen such that R =
2r = (2α)l > N . There is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween each element x ∈ ZN and its Montgomery represen-
tation xR mod N . This Montgomery representation allows
very efficient modular arithmetic especially for multiplica-
tion. Montgomery’s method for multiplying two integers
x and y (called N -residues) modulo N , avoids division by
N which is the most expensive operation in hardware. The
method requires conversion of x and y to an N -residue do-
main and conversion of the calculation result back to ZN.
The procedure is as follows. To compute Z = xy mod N ,
one first has to compute the Montgomery multiplication of
x and R2 mod N to get Z ′ = xR mod N . Mont(Z ′, y)
gives the desired result. When computing the Montgomery
product T =Mont(x, y) = xyR−1 mod N , the procedure
shown in Algorithm 1 is performed [17].
In the original notation of Montgomery after each mul-
tiplication a reduction was needed (Step 7 in Algorithm 1).
The input had the restriction X,Y < N and the output T
was bounded by T < 2N . As a consequence, if T > N , N
must be subtracted so that the output can be used as input of
the next multiplication. To avoid this subtraction a bound
for R is known [37] such that for inputs X,Y < 2N the
output is also bounded by T < 2N .
In [34] the need of avoiding reduction after each multi-
plication is addressed. In practice this means that the output
of the multiplication can be directly used as an input of the
next Montgomery multiplication. We want to find a bound
on R such that with X,Y < 2N the output of the Mont-
gomery multiplication T < 2N . Write R ≥ kN , then:
T =
XY +mN
R
=
XY
R
+
m
R
N <
4
k
N +N (2)
where, m = (XY mod R)N ′ mod R [1].
Hence, T < 2N for k ≥ 4, implying: 4N ≤ R. We
will use 4N < R = 2l+2, by taking α = 1 for simplicity
and making the iteration starting from Step 2 execute l + 2
times. As the result of the decision for α, −N−1 mod 2α
can be written as (2− n0)−1 mod 2. Because N is odd for
RSA and an odd prime for ECC, n0 = 1 which results to
N ′ = 1. We will use the Algorithm 2 for MMM which
includes these improvements.
Algorithm 1 Montgomery modular multiplication with fi-
nal subtraction
Require: N = (nl−1 · · ·n1n0)2α , x = (xl−1 · · ·x1x0)2α ,
y = (yl−1 · · · y1y0)2α with x, y ∈ [0, N − 1], R = (2α)l,
gcd(N, 2α) = 1 and N ′ = −N−1 mod 2α
Ensure: xyR−1 mod N
1: T← 0.
2: for i from 0 to (l − 1) do
3: mi ← (t0 + xiy0)N ′ mod 2α
4: T ← (T + xiy +miN)/2α
5: end for
6: if T ≥ N then
7: T ← T −N
8: end if
9: Return (T)
All the operations will be done modulo 2N through the
modular exponentiation. The final round in the modular ex-
ponentiation is the conversion to the integer domain, i.e.,
calculating the Montgomery multiplication of the last result
and 1. The same arguments as above prove that this final
Algorithm 2 Montgomery modular multiplication without
final subtraction
Require: N = (nl−1 · · ·n1n0)2, x = (xl · · ·x1x0)2, y =
(yl · · · y1y0)2 with x, y ∈ [0, 2N − 1], R = 2l+2,
gcd(N, 2) = 1
Ensure: xyR−1 mod 2N
1: T ← 0
2: for i from 0 to l + 1 do
3: mi ← (t0 + xiy0) mod 2
4: T ← (T + xiy +miN)/2
5: end for
6: Return (T)
step remains within the following bound: Mont(T, 1) ≤
N . In practice, AB mod N = N will never occur since
A 6= 0 mod N [1].
4 Hardware Implementation
4.1 Design Overview
Our system can be divided hierarchically into three lev-
els:
1. Systolic Array Cell: computes 1 bit of T in Step 4 of
Algorithm 2.
2. Systolic Array: computes one iteration of Step 2 of
Algorithm 2.
3. Montgomery Modular Multiplication Circuit
(MMMC): computes complete Algorithm 2.
4. Modular Exponentiator: combines modular multipli-
cations to realize modular exponentiation according to
Algorithm 3.
In the following sections we have described the system us-
ing a bottom-up approach.
4.2 Systolic Array Cells
The i-th iteration of Step 2 in Algorithm 2 computes the
temporary results
Ti = 2−α(Ti−1 + xi × Y +mi ×N + 2) (3)
where i = 0, · · · , l+ 1 and T−1 = 0 [35]. The j-th digit of
Ti is obtained using the recurrence relation
22×c1i,j+2×c0i,j+ti,j= ti−1,j+1+xi×yj+mi×nj
+2×c1i,j−1+c0i,j−1
(4)
i = 0, · · · , l + 1, j = 0, · · · , l, c1i,−1 = 0 and c0i,−1 = 0.
In Eq.(4), 2×c1i,j+c0i,j , j = −1, · · · , l, denotes the carry
chain up the adder.
The regular cell of the systolic array consists of two full-
adders (FA), one half-adder (HA) and two AND-gates as
shown in Fig. 1.(a). We can calculate mi by the following
equation:
mi = (ti−1,1 + xi × y0) mod 2 = ti−1,1 ⊕ xi × y0 (5)
i = 0, · · · , l + 1 and t−1,1 = 0. Here mi is not an input to
the rightmost cell, but obtained in the rightmost cell.
Because there is no carry input to the rightmost cell, the
equation for calculating ti,0 can be simplified as shown by
Eq. (6).
2× c0i,0 + ti,0 = ti−1,1 + xi × y0 +mi (6)
i = 0, · · · , l + 1 and t−1,1 = 0. By combining Eq. (5) and
Eq. (6), it can easily be shown that ti,0 = 0 and the equation
for calculating c0i,0 is as follows:
c00 = ti−1,1 + xi × y0 (7)
i = 0, · · · , l + 1 and t−1,1 = 0. The rightmost cell of the
systolic array consists of one AND, one OR and one XOR
gate as shown in the Fig. 1.(b).
Because there is only one carry input from rightmost cell,
Eq.(4) can be simplified for ti,1 as follows, which is ob-
tained by the cell shown in Fig. 1.(c). It consists of one FA,
two HAs and two AND-gates.
22×c1i,1+2×c0i,1+ti,1 = ti−1,2+xi×y1+mi×n1+c00
(8)
i = 0, · · · , l + 1 and t−1,2 = 0.
Because nl = 0, the equation of ti,l can be simplified as
follows:
2× ti,l+1 + ti,l = ti−1,l+1 + xi × yl
+2× c1i,l−1 + c0i,l−1 (9)
i = 0, · · · , l + 1 and t−1,l+1 = 0. This equation is imple-
mented by the l-th cell, which is shown in Fig. 1.(d). This
cell consists of one FA, one AND and one XOR-gate.
The i-th row computes Ti from Ti−1. Each cell operates
in a single clock cycle. Then the i, j-th cell processes the
digits of Eq.(4) at clock cycle time 2i+ j.
4.3 Systolic Array
To obtain a linear, pipelined modular multiplier, only one
row of cells is taken. The j-th cell behaves like cell (i, j),
computing Eq.(4) at time 2i+ j for i = 0, · · · , l + 1.
The schematic view of the systolic array is shown in
Fig. 2. X(0) denotes the least significant bit (LSB) of the
register in which the input X is stored. T denotes the inter-
mediate value register. The carry chain is stored in the C0
and C1 registers.
Fig. 2 shows that the Tj+1 output of (j + 1)-th cell is
used as an input for j-th cell during the next iteration. This
way the division by 2 in Step 4 of Algorithm 1 is realized.
Total area of the systolic array is (5l − 3)XOR+ (7l −
7)AND + (4l − 5)OR gates and 4l flip-flops. The critical
path is the same as the critical path of one regular cell and
it is independent of the bit length of the operands. So it is
2TFA(cin → cout) + THA(cin → cout).
4.4 Modular Montgomery Multiplication Circuit
The MMMC has three l-bit data inputs X , Y and N ,
one START instruction input, one DONE output, which in-
dicates that the operation is ended, and an l-bit RESULT
output.
The MMMC is designed using the algorithmic state ma-
chine (ASM) approach. For detailed information about
ASM approach, reader is referred to [15]. The circuit con-
sists of a controller and a data path as shown in Fig. 3. The
controller has four states, IDLE, MUL1, MUL2 and OUT.
The data path consists of a systolic array, four internal reg-
isters, a counter and a comparator. The controller stays in
0
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Figure 4. Algorithmic state machine of Mont-
gomery modular multiplier
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Figure 2. Schematic view of complete systolic array
the START input is set, X , Y and N registers are loaded by
input values, the T register and the counter are reset.
In MUL1, the outputs of the systolic array cells are writ-
ten to the T register and controller goes to the MUL2 state.
When the controller is in the MUL2 state, the counter is in-
cremented by 1. When the counter value reaches 2(l + 1),
the comparator sets the “count-end” signal. Then the con-
troller goes to the OUT state in which the value of the T
register is written to the RESULT output and the acknowl-
edgement signal DONE is set.
In the MUL2 state, the X register is shifted one bit right
and the most significant bit (MSB) of the X register is filled
0. This ensures that, during the last iteration of Step 2 of
Algorithm 2, the value of X(0) will be 0.
As mentioned before ti,j is calculated at the (2i + j)-th
clock cycle, i = 1, · · · , l + 2 and j = 1, · · · , l. tl+2,l is
calculated at the (2(l + 2) + l)-th clock cycle. Hence, the
total number of clock cycles for completing one modular
Montgomery multiplication equals 3l + 4 .
In the previous work from Blum and Paar [4] the cells
process u-bit data in one clock cycle. The 3-bit control reg-
isters are put in the cells to control the output of four com-
plex multiplexors. These bring high latency on the critical
path of the one cell and as a consequence, the clock fre-
quency is lower. In this work, cells process 1-bit in one
clock cycle, the circuit is constructed only using combina-
tional elements and the architecture is much more simpler
as shown in Fig. 1.
In [4], total number of bits used for control logic is
3d˙l/ue-bit. The role of the control in their circuit and how
they implemented the complete algorithm using it is not
clear. In this work, the control logic is log2(l + 2) + 2-bit,
including 2-bit state register, log2(l + 2)-bit counter and
a comparator. It is implemented separately from systolic
array as shown in Figure 3 and controls the execution of
the modular Montgomery multiplication algorithm accord-
ing to the ASM shown in Figure 4.
Implementation Results of The Modular Mont-
gomery Multiplication Circuit: The MMMC is imple-
mented on Xilinx V812E-BG-560-8 (Virtex E) FPGA.
Number of slices (S), clock period (Tp), time-area prod-
uct (TA) and time for one MMM (TMMM ) for different bit
CONTROLLER SYSTOLIC ARRAY
START
DONE
X NY
RESULT
load
COUNTER
0 to l+1
RATOR
COMPA−
shift right for X register
load
reset
increment value of counter
count−end
l+1−bit   X, Y, N    Registers
(l+1)−bit   T    Register
Figure 3. Architecture of the Montgomery modular multiplier circuit
length l are given in Table 2.
As it is shown in Table 2, the clock frequency is inde-
pendent from the bit length. This property gives our circuit
the advantage of suitability to various applications with dif-
ferent bit lengths like RSA and ECC.
4.5 Modular Exponentiation and RSA
The RSA algorithm is based on modular exponentia-
tion. The private key of a user consists of two large primes
p and q and an exponent D. The public key consists of
the modulus N = p · q and an exponent E such that
E = D−1 mod lcm((p − 1), (q − 1)). To encrypt a mes-
sage M the user computes: C = ME mod N . Decryption
is done by M = CD mod N . Modular exponentiation can
be realized by using the standard square and multiply algo-
rithm as given by Algorithm 3 [17].
Algorithm 3 Modular exponentiation
Require: Integers N , 0 ≤ M < N , 0 < E < N , E =
(et−1, et−2, · · · , e0)2, et−1 = 1
Ensure: ME mod N
1: A→M
2: for i from t− 2 to 0 do
3: A→ AA mod N
4: if ei = 1 then
5: A→ AM mod N
6: end if
7: end for
8: Return (A)
If MMMC is used for multiplication then the result will
be with an extra factor R−1 = 2−(l+2). This is compen-
sated by pre-Montgomery multiplying M by R2 mod N ,
so that MR mod N is fed into the exponentiator. The
square in Step 3 of Algorithm 3 will be Mont(AR,AR) =
A2R mod N and the multiplication in Step 5 of Algo-
rithm 3 will be Mont(AR,MR) = AMR mod N . Hence
the result of the modular exponentiation will be MER mod
N . The only post-processing is then another Montgomery
multiplication by 1, which removes R.
The pre-computation is done in 2(2(l + 2) + 1) + l =
5l + 10 clock cycles. One multiplication or square takes
3l + 4 clock cycles. If all the bits of E are 1 then the com-
plete exponentiation takes 2l(3l + 4) clock cycles. If only
one bit of E is 1 then it takes l(3l+4). The post-processing
takes 2 + l clock cycles. So the complete timing of modu-
lar exponentiation, Tmod−exp can be given by the following
inequality:
3l2 + 10l + 12 ≤ Tmod−exp ≤ 6l2 + 14l + 12 (10)
l is the number of bits in N . The average times needed
for one modular exponentiation for different bit lengths are
given in Table 1.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have described an efficient systolic array architecture
for modular multiplication which is basic operation for pub-
lic key cryptosystems as RSA and ECC. We use the method
of Montgomery, which is proven to be very efficient and
secure in hardware. Namely, the optimal bound is achieved
which, with some savings in hardware, omits completely all
reduction steps that are presumed to be vulnerable to side-
channel attacks. Also we realize a modular exponentiator
Table 1. Clock period (Tp) and average time for one mod-
ular exponentiation (Tmod−exp) for different bit length l on
Xilinx V812E-BG-560-8
Tp The average Tmod−exp
l ns ms
32 9.256 0.046
128 10.242 0.775
256 9.956 2.974
512 10.501 12.468
1024 10.458 49.508
Table 2. Number of slices (S), clock period (Tp), time-
area product (TA) and time for one MMM (TMMM ) for
different bit length l on Xilinx V812E-BG-560-8
# S Tp TA TMMM
l ns S · ns µs
32 225 9.256 2082.6 0.926
64 418 9.221 3854.38 1.807
128 806 10.242 8255.05 3.974
256 1548 9.956 15411.88 7.686
512 2972 10.501 31208.97 16.171
1024 5706 10.458 59673.35 32.168
which uses repeating modular multiplications. We imple-
mented our architecture on Xilinx V812E-BG-560-8 (Vir-
tex E) FPGA which is very useful to try efficiently different
design choices, i.e., different algorithms for modular multi-
plication and exponentiation for less expense compared to
ASIC.
One direction in which this work should go is to imple-
ment also an ECC basic operation, i.e., point multiplication.
This operation does not require modular exponentiation but
modular multiplication only, so all required components are
available. A cryptographic device dealing with both types
of PKC would be very useful to secure communication sys-
tems.
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